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Aristotle’s Formal Language
Mary Mulhem 
Brookside Institute
Introduction
Over the last half-century and more, attempts have been made to disengage 
Aristotle’s own logic from the logic that dominated the schools from antiquity forward— 
the so-called traditional logic. Most of the scholarly attention has been focussed on the 
system of inferences.1 It remains to be shown how the propositions furnishing the 
premisses and conclusions of the inferences are to be construed.
Aristotle’s analysis of propositions in the Prior Analytics differs from his analysis 
in the Categories and On Interpretation. There Aristotle analyzes propositions into verbs 
and nouns, and this approach suggests a modem function-argument analysis. A 
distinctive feature of the Prior Analytics analysis, on the other hand, is Aristotle’s use of 
ύπάρχειυ as a second-order expression to convey the relation that the terms—not the 
designata of the terms-of a syllogism have to one another. In the Prior Analytics, 
Aristotle’s treatment of propositional structure, in which ύπάρχειυ is not a vague 
expression but one with a deliberately minimal meaning, is framed to accommodate to 
syllogistic the propositional structure of the rest of the Organon, especially both types of 
predication distinguished in the Categories, On Interpretation, and Topics—descriptive 
and definitory.
In the Prior Analytics treatment of propositional structure, Aristotle employs a 
notation consisting at least of his basic three-term schemata of Greek capital placeholder 
letters2 but able to be supplemented. For the three authentic figures, these schemata are 
ΑΒΓ, ΜΝΞ, and ΠΡΣ. These schemata are a limiting case of schema, consisting entirely 
of blanks, in a spatially-ordered arrangement. It is likely that Aristotle himself used 
connecting lines in his diagrams to exhibit the relations of the terms to one another, 
perhaps elaborating these into lune-and-triangles proof forms of the three figures, such as 
appear from Ammonius forward. I urge that, in the notation that Aristotle used in 
diagrams, the connecting lines occur where he might have used inflections of 
ύπάρχειυ in speech or writing. This examination of Aristotle’s formal language corrects 
the view that his logic uses propositions of the subject-copula-predicate form and that the 
intended interpretation of his syllogistic is a logic of class inclusion and exclusion.
Logical Syntax in the Categories and On Interpretation
In the Categories and On Interpretation, Aristotle’s logical syntax includes nouns 
(names), verbs (predicates), formulae composed of nouns and verbs, truth-functional
1 E.g. John Corcoran, “Aristotle’s Natural Deduction System,” in Ancient Logic and its Modern 
Interpretations, ed. John Corcoran (Dordrecht: Reidel), 1974.
2 Lynn E. Rose, Aristotle’s Syllogistic (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas), 1968.
operators, quantifiers, and modal operators.3 A noun or name (όνομα) is for Aristotle “a 
sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is 
significant apart from the rest” (De Int. 16al9-21). Some natural sounds, as those made 
by beasts, are significant; but none of these is a name—a conventional sound 
(σύμβολον, a28). Names serve as arguments to proposition-forming functors; some 
inflections of nouns are excluded as not meeting this condition (De Int. 16a35-b5). A 
name need only have sense; Aristotle does not require that it have reference as well. A’ 
name may fail to refer either because it names something fictitious or impossible (for 
example, τραγέλαφος, goat-stag, at Delnt. 16al7, Aristotle’s ‘Pegasus’), or because it
names something which might exist but does not (for example, μή όντος Σωκράτους, 
the non-existent Socrates, at Cat. 13b 17, Aristotle’s ‘the present king of France’).
For Aristotle, a verb or predicate ('ρήμα) is
that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the 
notion of time . . . .  it is a sign of something said of something else 
. . .  i.e. of something either predicable of or present in some other 
thing. (Delnt. 16b6-ll).
A verb proper indicates present time; a predicate expression referring to time other than 
the present is not a verb simply but a tense (πτώσις) of a verb (De Int. 16al6-19).
Verbs and tenses of verbs are proposition-forming functors. No expression, no matter 
how complex, is a proposition unless it contains a verb (De Int. 17al 1-15).
A noun or verb standing alone is well-formed to the extent that it is significant. A 
noun or verb standing alone, however, is not a sentence and has no truth-value (De Int. 
16al0-19). Verbs not conjoined with arguments are names (ονόματα, 16b20). They 
may stand for states of affairs (πράγματα , cf. του πράγματος, 16b23), but they 
make no assertions about states of affairs unless conjoined with arguments.
A sentence (λόγος) is for Aristotle a significant utterance (φωνή σημαντική) 
whose parts have independent meaning, but only the sentence as a whole makes any 
affirmation or denial (De Int. 16b26-27). Every sentence is significant and signifies by 
convention. Not every sentence, however, is a declarative sentence (17a3). A prayer, for 
instance, is a sentence, but not a declarative sentence, since it has no truth-value (17a5-6). 
Declarative sentences are the subject matter of logic; the study of non-declarative 
sentences belongs to rhetoric or poetry (17a6-7).
3 Peirce picked up on this and remarks that Aristotle “in his treatise upon forms o f propositions, the De 
Interpretatione, analyzes the categorical proposition into the noun, or nominative, and the verb." C. S. 
Peirce, Collected Papers, ed. Charles Hartshome and Paul Weiss (Cambridege: Harvard University Press), 
4.41 Peirce used ‘rhema’ (transliterating Aristotle’s ’ρήμα) as his own technical term for ‘predicate’ in 
what cannot but be an acknowledgement o f Aristotle’s use in On Interpretation. Collected Papers 2.95. 
Peirce’s editors note at this point: “Today the rhema, or rheme, is conventionally symbolized as φχ and is 
called a propositional function.”
A sentence is well-formed for Aristotle—a combined expression 
(λεγόμενον κατά συμπλοκήν, cf. Cat. Ial6-19)—if it contains a name in the subject 
place and a verb in the predicate place. A sentence with the name of an individual in the 
predicate place is ill-formed, as is any sentence with a predicate of lower order than its 
subject. Only combined expressions are true or false (Cat. 2a4-10; De Int. 17a3-4).
Aristotle recognizes several varieties of negation. According to him, a negation 
may be applied to a declarative sentence simply or to a declarative sentence preceded by 
a modal operator; in either case, negation’s role is truth-functional. Negations may be 
applied also to nouns and verbs. A negation applied to a name yields what Aristotle calls 
an indefinite name (όνομα άόριστον. De Int. 16a32). A negation applied to a verb 
yields what Aristotle calls an indefinite verb (άόριστον 'ρήμα, 16b 15). An indefinite 
verb may be used both of arguments that refer and of arguments that fail to refer.
It is interesting to note that ύπάρχειν occurs in both the Categories and On 
Interpretation in contexts that support its metalinguistic interpretation. In the Categories, 
where Ackrill was unsatisfied with “the blanket term ‘belong to’,” ύπάρχειν occurs after 
12b29, as he noted, whereas Aristotle has used ‘is in’ or ‘is said o f  before. Here, 
ύπάρχειν figures in a discussion of the distinction of positives and privatives from 
contraries, where Aristotle is clearly concerned with the proper use of opposed 
expressions and is deriving laws for the assignment of contraries. In On Interpretation, 
ύπάρχειν is employed at 16a34 in the discussion of “indefinite nouns” (Aristotle’s 
example is ‘not-man’), which, he says, we assign to all sorts of things, both existent and 
non-existent (έφ’ ότουούν ύπάρχει και όντος και μή όντος). He uses it again at 
16b 12-15 in his discussion of “indefinite verbs,” in the identical locution. The message 
here is that while being, τό  ôv, famously for Aristotle, λέγεται πολλαχώ ς “is 
predicated in many senses” (Metaph. 1028al0; cf. 1003b6-10,1017a23-30), 
τό  μή ôv, the non-existent, is neither a substance nor an accident, so that it cannot figure 
as either subject or predicate in Aristotle’s theory of definitory and descriptive 
predications. Yet we can form sentences in which these nameless names of non-existents 
occur, and for these sorts of sentences which ascribe something to some non-thing or 
some non-thing to something, Aristotle uses ύπάρχειν.
Aristotle recognizes quantifying conventions for subjects and for propositions but 
not for predicates (De Int. 17a39-bl6). Designata (τω ν πρα γμ ά τω ν, 17a39) of subject 
expressions are universal if they are such that their signs can be predicated of many 
subjects (‘man,’ for instance, designates a universal); they are individual if they are such 
that their signs cannot be predicated of many subjects (‘Callias,’ for instance, designates 
an individual).
Premisses in the Prior Analytics
In developing the logical syntax of his syllogistic, Aristotle does not begin with 
terms and go on to build up propositions with terms and connectors. He starts by 
defining ‘premiss’ (An. Pr. 24al6):
Πρότασις μέν ούν έστι λόγος καταφατικός ή άποφατικός τίνος κατά 
τίνος- ούτος δέ ή καθόλου ή έν μέρει ή άδιόριστος.
A premiss is an affirmative or negative statement of something about some 
subject. This statement may be universal or particular or indefinite, (trans. 
Tredennick)
Aristotle then engages in a discussion of the distinction of syllogistic premisses 
from demonstrative and dialectical premisses, and only after that, at 24b 16, states that 
“terms” (όροι) are that into which premisses can be analyzed—κατηγορούμενον, 
‘predicate,’ and καθ’ού κατηγορεΤται, ‘subject.’ No reference is made to a connector. 
The infinitive ύπάρχειν appears in Aristotle’s discussion of premisses at 24al8:
λέγω  δέ καθόλου μέν τό  παντι ή μηδενι ύπάρχειν
By universal I mean applies to all, or to none (trans. Tredennick, modified)
Although ύπάρχειν is widely used in ancient Greek, Aristotle’s constructions 
with ύπάρχειν not only strike English speakers as odd, but, as Patzig points out, their 
unnaturalness in Greek is remarked by Alexander.4 Patzig and Smith both point out that 
ύπάρχειν is artificial, in the sense of being stilted or possibly technical.5 Patzig 
considers the reasons that Alexander proposes for Aristotle’s choosing such artificiality. 
The first is that “because in this way the union of the terms (συναγω γή τω ν  
λόγων) is clear.” Patzig says that he does not understand this but refers in his note 23 to 
the occurrence in a logical sense in Aristotle of συναγω γή only in the Rhetoric 
(1400b26 andl410a22), where Patzig says that “it means much the same as the logical 
proof of a proposition.”6 It clearly means the same in the quotation from Alexander, 
provided one doesn’t insist on rendering τω ν  λόγω ν “of the terms” as if it were 
τω ν  όρων, but rather ‘of the sentences’ or ‘of the statements.’
Not only does Aristotle use λόγος consistently for ‘sentence’ in the Categories 
and On Interpretation, but, as Prior noticed, the Athenian Stranger in Plato’s Sophist,
262C6-7, says that, when you combine a verb with a noun, there is a λόγος that is
τω ν  λόγω ν ό πρώ τος τε και σμικρότατος-the first and littlest kind of λόγος.7 
This statement of the Stranger’s indicates both that the structure of the simplest sentence
4 In An. Pr. I in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, ed. Maximilian Wallies (Berlin: G. Reimer), 1905, p. 
54, 21-29.
5 Gunther Patzig, Aristotle 'sTheory o f the Syllogism, trans. Jonathan Barnes (Dordrecht: Reidel), 1968, pp. 
9-11. Robin Smith in Aristotle, Prior Analytics, translated, with introduction, notes, and commentary by 
Robin Smith (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), 1989, xviii, “quite artificial;” cf. 107, “The 
locutions ‘belongs to some,’ etc. are peculiar to Aristotle and not at all everyday Greek.”
6 Patzig seems to be correct in this. The text at 1400b26 identifies σ υ ν α γ ω γ ή  with elenctic enthymemes 
and the text at 1410a22 defines elenchus (indirect proof) as a bringing together (σ υ να γω γή ) o f contraries.
7 A. N. Prior, Formal Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University), 1962, pp. 72-73.
parallels that enunciated by Aristotle and that there was current an Academic definition 
of a λόγος as consisting of at least two terms.8 Figuring that this definition was known 
to Aristotle and was passed down to the Peripatetics, it seems likely Alexander may be 
understood to be saying that Aristotle’s choice of construction makes the proof clearer. 
Patzig accepts Alexander’s second reason, that ύπάρχειν takes the dative (as “to all” 
[παντι] and “to none” [μηδενι] above make clear) and thus makes obvious which term 
is subject and which is predicate. Patzig urges a comparison with the function/argument 
symbolism of modem mathematical logic, ascribing to Aristotle the same concern to 
“reveal with all possible clarity the logical structure of the propositions which enter the 
syllogism as premisses or conclusion.”9
I wish to suggest that ύπάρχειν is a metalinguistic operator indicating the 
relation of terms-not objects or the designata of terms-to one another in the premisses of 
his syllogistic.10 The Prior Analytics premiss construction, if taken to be in the object 
language, is inconsistent with Aristotle’s remarks on predication in the Categories and 
On Interpretation, except for a few occurrences of ύπάρχειν in those works, where the 
role of the expression is clearly metatheoretical. Aristotle in the Categories worked out 
what are traditionally known as the predicaments, a sorting of names into names of 
primary and secondary substances and into names falling into the nine categories of 
accidents, that is to say, names that designate beings of one sort or another. Aristotle has, 
moreover, in the Topics, worked out a scheme of predicables—genus, accident, 
definition, and property—that, with differentia, provide him with tools for analyzing the 
logical behaviour of premisses that, in the case of the Topics, include dialectical 
premisses. The predicables clearly belong to the language of the metatheory of 
predication, as they are headings for sorting kinds of predicate expressions considered 
as actually playing roles in predicative formulae. It is especially obvious in the cases of 
definition and property, which for Aristotle are products—not conditions—of analysis, 
that propositions predicating either of these of a subject make no assertion that the 
definition or property belongs to the subject in the sense that the subject possesses it as it 
would possess something real.
Aristotle’s choice of vocabulary serves to separate the Prior Analytics analysis of 
propositions from that in the rest of the Organon, which distinguishes definitory from 
descriptive predication. The examples that Aristotle supplies as values for his term 
variables include both definitory predicates like ‘animal’ and descriptive predicates like
8 These matters are discussed in J.J. Mulhem’s unpublished paper
“TGON Λ Ο Γ ω Ν  Ο Π Ρ ω Τ Ο Σ  TE ΚΑΙ ΣΜΙΚΡΟΤΑΤΟΣ (, 262C6-7),” 2001.
9 Patzig 1968, ρ. 11.
10In this view o f some o f the language o f the Prior Analytics, I am anticipated by Prior and Rose. As J. J. 
Mulhem in “Modem Notations and Ancient Logic” in Corcoran (1974) remarks, “Rose followed an aside 
of Prior (1962) in suggesting that Aristotle had formulated his assertoric analytical syllogisms as inference 
schemata in the metalanguage rather than as laws in the object language.” As Rose himself remarks, “What 
I am suggesting is, in more modem terms, that many o f Aristotle’s remarks are in something like a 
syntactical meta-language: they are not statements of syllogisms, but rather they are statements about 
syllogisms,” p. 25.
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‘white,’ which suggests that ύπάρχειυ is chosen as neutral between these two kinds of 
predication and thus accommodates both of them. It is thus not a vague, untechnical 
“blanket term”11 but a technical term, used with a deliberately minimal meaning. It 
figures, moreover, not only in his assertoric syllogistic but in his modal syllogistic as 
well.
Further, Aristotle used a sign—made a gesture or drew a line—to represent the 
relation of terms appearing in a syllogistic figure when he presented his deductive 
schemata in formal notation when teaching. This is indicated clearly in later diagrams, 
where inflections of ύπάρχειυ, either as such or modified by modal expressions, are 
written along the connecting lines.
If, as is urged here, ‘belongs to’ is not, for Aristotle, what we would look at as a 
dyadic predicate in the object language, then one of the points at which the Peripatetics 
and the Stoics are thought to have been at loggerheads is resolved. Jonathan Barnes and 
Michael Frede have written as if ‘belongs to’ were a dyadic predicate in the object 
language, perhaps misled by ‘belongs to’ as a translation of ύπάρχειυ.12 Their views are 
discussed by Phillip Corkum13 in examining two Stoic examples of unmethodically 
conclusive arguments, one employing the relation ‘is greater than’ and the other the 
relation ‘is equal to’ and both depending on the assumption of the transitive law to be 
transformable into satisfactory deductions, at least for the Stoics. Alexander reports14 
that the Stoics claimed that Aristotelian syllogisms were unmethodically conclusive as 
well and thus not deductions either. Alexander does not report their reasoning, but 
Corkum indicates that Frede and Barnes have taken a stab at it, conjecturing that a 
syllogism in Barbara, for example, employs the relation ‘belongs to every’ and depends 
for its validity on assuming the dictum de omni. Frede goes on to say:
It would be up to the Peripatetics to show that assumptions about ‘belonging to’ 
are in a logically privileged position whereas assumptions about ‘being equal to’ 
or ‘being bigger than’ or ‘being a relative o f  are not in that position. But it is 
difficult to think of any satisfactory argument which would have shown that 
‘belonging to’ is in a privileged position and at the same time would not have 
indicated that other expressions are in the same privileged position and which 
therefore would have forced the Peripatetics to admit arguments as syllogisms 
which they did not want to count as such.15
" J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle 's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford: Clarendon Aristotle Series), 1963, p. 
109, note ad Cat. 1 lb38.
12 Jonathan Barnes, “Logical Form and Logical Matter,” in Lógica, mente, e persona, ed. A. Alberti 
(Florence: Olschki), 1990; Michael Frede, „Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic,“ Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie, 56: 1-32, 1974.
13 Phillip Corkum, “Is the Syllogistic a Logic?”, International Conference on Ancient and Medieval Logic, 
Fordham University Lincoln Center, 2003.
14 InAn.Pr. 345.15-18.
15 Frede 1974
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As has been argued above, however, ‘belongs to,’ as part of Aristotle’s 
metalanguage, is in a logically different—if not, perhaps, privileged— position vis-à-vis 
‘is greater than’ and ‘is equal to,’ which are dyadic predicates in the object language.
The Stoics are often portrayed as having the advantage of Aristotle in their explicit 
handling of these dyadic predicates in their logic. It is the case, nevertheless, that these 
dyadic predicates designate relations, which were known to or perhaps discovered by 
Aristotle, who placed them in the πρός τι slot among the nine accidents in his scheme of 
categories. Aristotle recognized the category of relation, distinguishing it especially from 
the category of quantity, and he placed such restrictions on the use of relative premisses 
in the Categories vii as would make them legitimate tools of argument and not just the 
vehicles of sharp practice that they were, for instance, for Euthydemus and Dionysodorus 
in Plato’s Euthydemus. C. S. Peirce, who knew something about the logic of relations, 
claimed an Aristotelian precedent for it.16
Aristotle, nonetheless, although he recognized and knew how to use premisses 
with dyadic predicates designating relations among objects, did not have a primary 
interest in these premisses in his theoretical work. Although accidental predicates, 
including relative ones, do figure among the examples and discussions in the Prior 
Analytics, Aristotle excluded them from his demonstrative syllogistic. Demonstration for 
Aristotle requires premisses with their predicates assigned universally (καθόλου), which 
means that they are assigned both to all (κατά παντός) and per se (καθ’ αύτό).17 
These strictures exclude accidental predicates, including relative ones.
Formal Language in the Graphical Representation of Aristotle’s Schemata
This section builds on Lynn Rose’s 1968 work on graphical representations of 
Aristotle’s syllogisms as they might have been used in his own lecturing,18 examining 
them in commentators and in the ancient classroom. The discussion shows that
• related drawings and diagrams are extant from Aristotle’s time
• his classroom very likely provided for them
• the Prior Analytics indicates elements of diagrams known later that could easily 
have been developed into these diagrams
• diagrams could easily have been lost from the Aristotelian manuscripts and then 
recovered
The diagrams are shown to have expository, mnemonic, and probative roles, and it is 
suggested, contra Bochenski, that the lune and triangle diagrams for syllogistic proofs 
and the pons asinorum diagram, for the proof of what for Aristotle is akin to a decision 
procedure, are features integral to his system, making it more likely that he discovered 
and used them himself.
16 CP 2.532, 2.577, and 3.643.
17 An. Post. 74a4-5; cf. 73a21-74a3; see Μ. M. Mulhem, “Aristotle on Universality and Necessity, 
Logique et Analyse, 12 (1969), pp. 288-299
18 Rose, Chapter III, Appendices IV and V.
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The Three-term Array. The Prior Analytics presents the first figure of the 
syllogism as a linear array of Greek capital letters, placeholders for the terms. Rose has 
established that Aristotle used a three-term array of letters to represent just the premisses 
of a syllogism, with the conclusion shown below as a separate line.19 For Aristotle’s 
three genuine figures, this gives, using the Greek capitals in the text of the Prior 
Analytics for each:
(1) (2) (3)
A B Γ M N £ Π Ρ Σ
A Γ N Z TIP
Rose points out that these concise three-letter forms are offered by Aristotle at 42b21, 
τ φ  ΑΒΓ (‘by the [syllogism] ΑΒΓ’), and at 65b4, τω ν  ΑΒΓ (‘of the [terms] ΑΒΓ’), 
where the inflection of the Greek definite article shows that the first is singular while the 
second is plural, so that Aristotle could use this notation either to refer to a single 
syllogism or to refer to its three terms. Rose remarks:
When Aristotle has occasion to discuss a syllogism, or to explain its validity 
or invalidity, he nearly always has to present more information about such 
matters as quantity, quality, figure, etc., than could be expressed by the three 
letters alone. . . .  The three-letter notation ΑΒΓ still represents the basic 
structure of the syllogism; but it is so concise that it rarely tells us all we need 
to know about a syllogism, and I suggest that this is why Aristotle has so 
little occasion to use it in his writings.20
The same evidence shows why Aristotle would have had so much occasion to use his 
concise notation to keep the basic matter before the students’ eyes while he made his 
points about them—the same as in a logic classroom today. As Rose suggests, however, 
more information has to be supplied, and there are indications in the Prior Analytics of 
how Aristotle did this.
The Curved Lines. While it is clear that the three-term arrays serve as displays 
of placeholder letters in the Prior Analytics, some have wondered whether they should be 
shown with lines connecting the terms. The Kneales suggested that Aristotle may have 
used curved lines, above (representing connections in the premisses) and below 
(representing a connection in the conclusion), to connect the letters.21
19 Rose, p. 23.
20 Rose, p. 21. The Kneales call the pairs o f Greek capitals “the skeleton o f a general statement,” p.68.
21 William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development o f Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, 
pp. 71-72. The Kneales cite Ammonius, p. x, but the scholium that Wallies cites in h ispraefatio contains 
lunes, not curved lines in isolation. There are arcs in some of the Scholia Platónica; cf. Robert S. 
Brumbaugh, “Logical and mathematical symbolism in the platonic scholia,” Journal o f the Warburg and 
Courtauld Instiue, XXIV: 45-58, 1961; see especially Plates a-IIIj, bllll, and Vh. J. A. Mulhem, whose 
indispensable help in the preparation o f this paper’s graphics I wish to acknowledge, has suggested to me 
that Aristotle may merely have made a gesture, which his students recorded as a curved line.
8
(1) (2) (3)
/Çb3~ τχ3^
Rose suggested that these lines would have been all below and the conclusion displayed 
separately from the premisses:
(1) (2) (3)
A B Γ M N i π  p ς
W W
A Γ N Ï π  pw
Here arcs under the letters are used to show how the terms are connected in the premisses 
(first line) and in the conclusion (second line). While this suggestion is plausible, 
evidence for it in Aristotle and the early commentators, such as Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, is slim, since these texts contain neither arcs like these nor the lunes and 
triangles appearing later, and since Alexander does not seem aware of these diagrams.22
The Lune and Triangles. In the fifth century, however, diagrams illustrating the 
three figures do appear in scholia to Ammonius’ commentary on Prior Analytics 1 and 
are used extensively by his student John Philoponus. These diagrams consist of a lune 
for the first figure, a normal equilateral triangle for the second, and an inverted equilateral 
triangle for the third.23 After Philoponus, the lune and triangles became quite common in 
mediaeval manuscripts of all sorts, including the Platonic Scholia.24 To simplify his 
presentation, Rose replaced the three sets of placeholder letters in the Prior Analytics by 
ΑΒΓ for all three figures. His diagrams idealize the varied extant specimens, preserving 
the position of the middle term as it is in the three-term arrays, in the middle in the first 
figure (B), to the left in the second (A), and to the right in the third figure (Γ).
(1) (2) (3)
22 “Alexander seems completely unaware o f any such diagrams,” Rose, p. 134. Rose cites Greek 
commentators on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, who do use arcs under their letter arrays to represent rhetorical 
syllogisms in the third figure, to support his position.
23 Ammonii in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Commentarium. In CAG, edited by Maximilian 
Wallies. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1899, vol. IV, part VI, especially viii, x-xii, and 39-42, and Ioannis Philoponi 
in Aristotelis Analytica Priora Commentaria, in CAG, 1905, vol. XIII, part II, in Rose, p. 133.
24 Brumbaugh calls them “the standard arc-and-triangle syllogism figures,” p. 46.
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The Proportion Diagrams. Rose mentions a passage “where Philoponus seems to 
be defending the naturalness of such diagrams.”25 In this passage, Philoponus is 
undoubtedly discussing arrangement (τάξις) of the three figures but his arrangements 
vary from the standard lime and triangle diagrams because he concludes: “Therefore 
according to the first figure the middle term is drawn in a straight line, according to the 
second it is drawn above, according to the third it is drawn below.” Here the first figure 
is “straight,” not a lune; the second has the middle term above, not below; and the third 
has the middle term below, not above. It seems more likely that Philoponus has in mind 
proportion diagrams employing lines, whose logical use is discussed by Einarson.26 In 
these diagrams, also displayed by Ross, APPA, ad 25b26ff, to which Philoponus’ 
commentary is directed, the length of the lines answers to the generality of the terms, as 
they appear next to the vertically arranged placeholder letters. In the first figure, the 
straight line for the middle term is in the middle; in the second, it is above; and in the 
third, it is below, all as Philoponus’ passage has it.
First Figure Second Figure Third Figure
A major (A )M middle_______ (A) Π major______
B middle (B )N major______  (B )P minor
Γ minor (Γ )3  minor ( r ) S middle
The Pons Asinorum. Alexander describes, under the rubric of diagram
(διάγραμμα), what became known in the Middle Ages as the pons The
diagram itself is not preserved in the text, but it appears, with Alexander’s examples, in 
Philoponus’ commentary and is found not only in our oldest Greek manuscript of the 
Prior Analytics but also in a scholium to an early Latin translation, possibly by Boethius, 
and in at least a hundred Latin MSS.of that work.28
Z E
Θ
H
25 Philoponus, 65:14-23, noted in Rose, p. 133, note 2.
26 Benedict Einarson, “On Certain Mathematical Terms in Aristotle’s Logic: Part II,” The American 
Journal o f Philology, Vol. 57, No. 2 (1936), pp. 151-172; see pp. 166-169.
27 Alexander,/« A n . Pr.,  CAG, ii (i), p.301:
σαφήνειας δέ χά ρ ιν  τ ώ ν  λεγομένω ν ύπ ογρ ά φ ω μ εν τά ς τε έκλογάς και τ ό  διάγραμμα ολον και 
τούς συλλογισμούς, π ώ ς τε και έκ τ ίνω ν γ ίνονται.
28 Kneale and Kneale, p. 186; cf. L. Minio-Paluello, “A Latin Commentary (? translated by Boethius) on 
the Prior Analytics, and its Greek Sources,” Journal o f Hellenic Studies, lxxvii, part I (1957), pp. 93-102. 
Philoponus, p. 274.
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The pons asinorum illustrates Aristotle’s own method of finding the middle term,
inventio medii to the Latin Middle Ages, with a practical aim, as he observes:
We must now state how we may ourselves always have a supply of 
syllogisms in reference to the problem proposed and by what road we may 
reach the principles relative to the problem: for perhaps we ought not only to 
investigate the construction of syllogisms, but also to have the power of 
making them.29
In Prior Analytics i.27-28, Aristotle details a technique, in his view the only one required, 
for finding syllogisms to prove conclusions of the four different kinds by finding a 
middle term. Then ensues what Smith considers a proof of the foregoing,30 in which 
Aristotle assigned placeholder letters—A, B, Γ, Δ, E, Z, Η, Θ—to the various groups of 
characters. Aristotle has a theoretical aim here as well, as Smith observes, in that his 
method in the Prior Analytics 1.27-28 “in the terminology of modem logic . . .  is 
comparable to a decision procedure for deductive systems.”31 Aristotle’s method 
provides for any predicate whatsoever, any subject whatsoever, and any well-formed 
formula of his system combining those terms with anything that follows from them, that 
they follow from, or that is extraneous to them. It thus exhausts all the possible 
premisses of his syllogistic, and is viewed by him as conclusive.
In the thirteenth century a mnemonic verse had been composed on the placeholder 
letters, the first eight in the Latin alphabet replacing the first eight in the Greek, to 
distinguish good connections from bad in the diagram.
FaCia CoGenti DeFert HeBere GraDendo GalBa valent, 
sed non constant HeDes FaBar HirCe.32
In this verse, as in the more familiar Barbara Celarent, the capital consonants—two per 
mood— identify the syllogistic moods by the placeholder letters on the diagram of the 
pons asinorum. The intervening vowels give the quantity and quality of the propositions, 
according to the mediaeval A, E, I, O designations. The figure of each syllogism is 
indicated on the diagram in Philoponus’ version. The verses, which treat of nine 
moods—six making syllogisms and three failing to do so, make it clear that their
29 An. Pr. 43a20-24, quoted in I. M. Bochenski, A History o f Formal Logic, trans. Ivo Thomas (New York: 
Chelsea Publishing Company), 1970, p. 81.
30 Smith, p. 152, note to 43b39-44al 1, but referring to 44al 1-35.
31 Smith, p. 150, ad 43b l-l 1. It should be noted here that Aristotle does not have in mind a contemporary 
definition o f a decision procedure as a mechanical method for conclusively testing any member o f an 
infinite set for having or lacking a certain property.31 The notion o f infinite sets is not unknown to 
Aristotle but is foreign to him, since he is interested in demonstration and takes the view that infinite series 
cannot be understood.
32 This verse is in Minio-Paluello, p. 98, n. 7. Minio-Paluello gives “FaBer” for one o f the asyllogistic 
moods, but this is impossible, since An. Pr. 44b31-32 and Philoponus agree that both premisses are 
affirmative and Philoponus has both universal. Bochenski gives some different mood names, following 
George o f Brussels, and indicating different quantities but the same order of placeholder letters, pp. 220- 
221.
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inventors had in mind all nine lines of Philoponus’ diagram. The correspondence of the 
verses to the diagram will be shown below.
Did conditions in the gymnasia and teaching practice in Aristotle’s time make it 
likely that he used diagrams when he taught syllogistic? On what surfaces did he write? 
Was Aristotle influenced by what mathematicians did? Henry Jackson thought it very 
likely that Aristotle used diagrams, as he remarked:
. . .  we may safely conjecture that there was, not a black board, but a white 
one, a λεύκωμα [a tablet covered with gypsum, used as a notice board, etc.
LSJ]: for sometimes, e.g. NE v 5 § 8 and § 12 and prior analytics 52al6, we 
have the description of a diagram, and in some instances the MSS. reproduce 
it. Indeed I think that such diagrams ought to be faithfully reproduced in the 
texts as a tradition dating from Aristotle himself.33
Hugh Tredennick, the Loeb translator of the Prior Analytics, was of the same 
opinion:
It is worth noting... that the use of the words opoç (bound or limit), 
άκρου (extreme) and μέσου (middle) to describe the terms, and of 
διάστημα (interval) as an alternative to πρότασις or premiss, suggests that 
Aristotle was accustomed to employ some form of blackboard diagram, as it 
were, for the purpose of illustration.34
Something like a black- or white-board may have been used, but the Greeks also 
employed many other media to record things. Papyrus and vellum were available but 
were very expensive. Pupils wrote on erasable wax tablets, and on bits of pottery and 
pieces of stone, because these latter were readily available and were cheap or free.35 
Numbers of well-developed architectural drawings on stone have been discovered, dating 
from the 6th century BC forward, by Haselberger, who has stated that it would have been 
odd if Aristotle and his school had not made use of diagrams in their teaching and 
research because the practice was so advanced and frequent among architects and 
craftsmen.36 Einarson has in mind lines on paper or in sand when he writes “The 
contemporary diagrams with which the doctrine of harmonics and proportion was 
illustrated were probably horizontal lines, of equal, or what is more likely, varying 
length, lying directly above or below each other, representing the öpoi, while the
“ Henry Jackson, “Aristotle’s Lecture-Room and Lectures,” The Journal o f Philology 35 (1920), 191-200, 
p. 193. On the whiteboard, cf. Η. I. Marrou, A History o f Education in Antiquity, trans. George Lamb (New 
York: The New American Library), Additional Note 17, p. 519.
34 Prior Analytics,translated by Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press), 1962, p. 184
35K. Dale Foster, The Classroom in Ancient Times (Unpublished dissertation, Halifax, Nova Scotia: 
Dalhousie University), 1994.
36 Lothar Haselberger, pers. comm.
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distances between them may originally have been thought of as representing the 
διαστήματα." 37 Mathematical diagrams even appear on coins.38
Rose was not convinced that Aristotle had used anything beyond the three-term 
array, declaring: “There is no textual evidence that Aristotle used curved lines, triangles, 
or any other special symbolism.”39 He does admit the probability of some use of lines by 
the ancient authors:
The word διάστημα, which Aristotle occasionally uses for “statement,” 
means a line or distance or interval, and thus seems to be a natural way of 
referring to the statement that connects two terms. It seems probable that 
both Plato and Aristotle connected terms with lines.40
Rose also cites Sir William Hamilton on the likelihood of lines and Aristotle’s use 
of geometrical terminology:
A proposition (διάστημα, intervallum, πρότασή, literally protensio, the 
stretching out of a line from point to point, is a mutual relation of two terms 
(öpoi) or extremes (άκρα). This is therefore well represented,—the two 
Terms, by two letters, and their Relation, by a line extended between them.41 
He also frequently—indeed as often as he can, borrows his Logical 
nomenclature from the language of Geometry; as
όρος, άκρον,-διάστημα, πρότασις,-σχήμα. Even the word Syllogism 
(συλλογισμός) is mathematical—a computation.42
Ross, also, is sensitive to Aristotle’s terminology having, as he puts it, “a 
mathematical air,” and he reasons from this that “It is not unlikely that he 
represented each figure of the syllogism by a different geometrical figure, in which 
the lines stood for propositions and the points for terms.”43
The question remains: if these diagrams were used in Aristotle’s school, what 
happened to them, so that they do not reappear until almost a millennium later? Almost 
all ancient works have a checkered history of transmission, but the notorious vicissitudes 
of Aristotle’s works must receive extraordinary consideration. The Prior Analytics, 
along with most of the rest of the extant Aristotelian material, consists of work not 
published externally by Aristotle but rather of lecture notes—his own or his
37 Einarson, p. 166.
38 Benno Artmann, “Euclid’s Elements and its Prehistory,” in ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΩΝ, ed. Ian
Mueller, in Apeiron,XXIV, 4 (December 1991), pp. 1-47.
39 Rose, p. 23.
40 Rose, p. 10. Cf. “A premiss was probably represented by a line joining the letters chosen to stand for the 
terms.” Tredennick, p. 184.
4lHamilton, Sir William. Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University , 3rd
edition (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons), 1866, p. 654, quoted in Rose, p. 10, n. 25.
42 Hamilton, p. 663, quoted in Rose, p. 10, n. 25.
43 Sir David Ross, Aristotle, 5th edition (London: Methuen & Co, Ltd), 1949, p. 33.
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students’-intemal to his teaching and research enterprises. On Aristotle’s death in 322 
BC, his manuscripts passed to Theophrastus, who kept them for more than 34 years in 
Athens. Theophrastus willed his own library with Aristotle’s to his pupil Neleus, who 
removed the books to his home at Scepsis in the Troad. Here Neleus and his family were 
obliged to conceal the volumes from the Attalid dynasty, who would have seized them 
for their library at Pergamon. About 100 BC, Apellicon of Teos bought them from the 
Neleids and brought them back to Athens. After Sulla’s capture of Athens in 86 BC, they 
were brought to Rome, where they were studied by Tyrannion and Andronicus of 
Rhodes, as Strabo reports.44 Unfortunately, Neleus’ heirs had hid the collection in a pit, 
where they had been much damaged. Again according to Strabo,45 Apellicon, a 
bibliophile, and Tyrannion, a grammarian, made and caused to be made unskillful 
corrections and supplements. Andronicus of Rhodes did a somewhat better job, and it is 
on his edition that the modem corpus Aristotelicum rests, although the earliest 
manuscripts are much later, dating from the 9th and 10th centuries AD.
This history shows us, first, that, if there were diagrams originally, there was not a 
standard published text to put them in. As we all know, with course notes in a library, 
different—more or less complete— versions often exist side by side in different formats, 
especially from year to year. Next, assuming that, from at least near the beginning, there 
were diagrams to illustrate the syllogistic, there was ample opportunity for them to have 
been lost.
From the Three-term Arrays to the Lune and Triangles. The three-term array, 
established convincingly by Rose, shows clearly the relation of the terms and the 
difference of the three figures one from another. Rose has also shown that, if there were 
lines, they were most likely downward-curving lines, not a combination of upward and 
downward lines as suggested by the Kneales, but he argues that there is no textual 
evidence that Aristotle used these lines or other devices.46 Here, nevertheless, Rose does 
have textual evidence of a kind, from Aristotle’s use of the expression ύπάρχειν, one of 
the spatial expressions prominent in Aristotle’s development of his syllogistic. The 
expression, often translated ‘belongs to’ or ‘applies to,’ is compounded of the preposition 
ύπό, under,’ and the verb άρχειν, ‘to begin, be the leader of.’ It might mean that 
B leads under A, and Γ leads under B, so that Γ leads under A, and so on. It thus 
contains a spatial element, as we have come to expect in Aristotle’s logical vocabulary, 
and that spatial element is ‘under’ and thus supports the arcs under the place-holding 
letters. The figure or σχήμα, basis of Aristotelian syllogistic, is designated by the same 
word as geometric figure, suggesting that in his research leading up to the writing of the 
Prior Analytics Aristotle represented the syllogistic figures by geometric figures.
4 4  j
John Edwin Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, 3 vols. 3 edition (New York and London: 
Hafner Publishing Company), 1967, pp.85-86.
45 XIII, 1.54, quoted in John Patrick Lynch, Aristotle ’s School ( Berkeley: University o f California Press), 
1972, p.201.
46The Kneales, agreeing with Rose’s position on Aristotle’s use o f three-term linear arrays for all three 
figures, argue that the diagrams make it obvious why Aristotle assumed that there could be only three 
syllogistic figures.
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Aristotle uses σχήμα, along with μορφή, ‘shape,’ in the Categories in his discussion of 
figure as one of the kinds of quality.47 Here his examples are qualities of geometric 
figures—triangular and quadrangular. The three schemata of the Prior Analytics are 
schemata in the modem sense, syntactic strings with blanks as placeholders.48 The 
figures are schemata, from which are generated the moods, also schemata, which are 
argument-text templates, from which in turn are generated the indefinitely many 
syllogisms, which makes the syllogisms instances of schemata. The Aristotelian figures 
are a limiting case of schema, as being all blanks, with no normal characters between the 
blanks in the string. The placeholder characters, nevertheless, are in a spatially-ordered 
arrangement with regard to one another.
The Aristotelian syllogism produces its conclusion by having a middle term 
common to its two premisses. In Aristotle’s three term arrays, the middle term is in the 
middle (between the two extremes) in the first or perfect figure, which is called ‘first’ or 
‘perfect’ partly for this reason. Since there are only three placeholders in each figure, 
there are only two other possible positions for the middle term in the other two figures, to 
the left and to the right. This gives us the three arrangements that we have already seen, 
but now with P standing for ‘predicate [of the conclusion],’ S for ‘subject [of the 
conclusion],’ and M for ‘middle’:
(1) (2) (3)
•
P M S M P S P S Mw w
P s P s P s
w w
It is not difficult to see how the three-term arrays for the three figures evolve into a 
lune and two triangles, although this evolution springs from the single-line three- 
term arrays, not requiring the conclusion to be written as a separate line. The first 
figure is obvious, as it merely requires joining P and S of the conclusion with a 
longer curved line that joins the shorter arcs at the ends of the three-term array, 
giving a three-sided figure, although all the sides are curved. For the second figure: 
join the conclusion terms with a line in the three-term array, thus giving a three- 
sided figure, straighten out all the lines, and drop the leftmost and rightmost terms, 
the middle term remaining on the left but now on the bottom. For the third figure, 
proceed as for the second figure, and drop only the center term, leaving the middle 
term still at the right and still at the top. The diagrams are at least mnemonic in 
purpose, so they need to be distinct from one another. The “standard” three 
diagrams accomplish this in the simplest way, with three three-sided figures, 
preserving the position of the middle term in the figures as middle, left, and right.
4710a; cf. Thomas Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle (Oxford at the Clarendon Press), 1949, p. 19.
48 John Corcoran, "Schema", The Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/schema/>.
15
(1) (2) (3)
Thus it is plain how the diagrams may have developed from the schemata and 
how they are used to distinguish and recall some features of the limiting case schemata 
that are the three-term arrays of placeholder letters. Their next use is to provide 
argument-templates for the moods, since the three-term arrays leave no room for 
quantity, quality, or modality. These last, on the other hand, are easily written along the 
lines of the diagrams, and this is, in fact, the way that they appear in the manuscripts.49 
Sometimes the terms are given as well, which yields an instance of the mood schema, 
that is to say, a syllogism proper. Thus we see that:
• the Greek capitals give us placeholders for the terms
• the three-term array of Greek capitals gives us a limiting-case schema for the 
three figures of syllogism, with the positions of the placeholders indicated
• the three-term array with the linking curved lines specifies which placeholders 
are related to one another
• the lune and triangles show us how the placeholders or terms are related, make it 
easier to remember how the three figures are distinguished, and provide handy 
spaces for specifying the quantity, quality, and modality of the relations
From the Text to the Proportion Diagrams
Einarson urges that it is probable that Aristotle used the proportion diagrams 
because of their common use of letters of the alphabet for the terms as extremes of the 
lines.50 He adduces Nichomachean Ethics 1131bl-3 (a little before Jackson’s example at 
1133a), dealing with the proportion of desert and reward, as evidence of Aristotle’s 
discussion of a diagram in which terms were represented as lines, “as the feminine article 
shows [since the Greek word for Tine,’ γραμμή, is feminine, and such expressions as 
ή AB, naming lines by their extremities, are widely used]”.51 That these were horizontal, 
parallel lines and not segments of a continuous line is indicated by the placing of line B 
twice, by the fact that a man and his reward are not two quantities of the same kind, and
49 This is true both o f Philoponus, see Wallies’ preface, p. xxxvii, and of the Scholia Platónica, see 
Brumbaugh, p.51, and Figures Ills, Illr, and Ve.
50 Einarson, p. 166, n.64. He refers to Ptolemy, Harmonica, I, 5; Euclid, Elementa, V and VII-1X, passim; 
and the Sectio Canonis.
51 Einarson, p. 167; cf. p. 166, n. 68 and the Sectio Canonis and Euclid, Elements, V and VII-X.
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by Aristotle’s frequent use of άνω , ‘above,’ and κάτω  and υπό, ‘’below,’ of the scale 
of predication. Einarson suggests that the use of such a diagram can be confirmed from 
the discussion of conversion in all three figures in Prior Analytics II, 8-10.52
From the Proof of the Decision Procedure to the Pons Asinorum
We have seen the rather ancient pons asinorum diagram and one set of the 
surviving late mediaeval verses that expound it. We will use the verses, which embody 
Aristotle’s placeholder letters, and his own remarks to generate the diagram.
Announcing in 44al3 that perhaps the preceding, in which he has detailed his 
decision procedure for syllogistic, will be clearer, Aristotle introduces eight placeholder 
letters in his proof of the foregoing decision procedure. Would any teacher ask his 
students to remember eight placeholder letters without writing them down? A stands for 
any predicate you like, within the formation rules of the Prior Analytics, and is written on 
the left, where Aristotle always writes his predicates because of the oblique constructions 
with ύττάρχειν. E stands for any subject that you like, within the same strictures, and is 
written on the right, where Aristotle always writes his subjects. B stands for all that 
follows from A and is written next to it, at the top. Γ stands for all that from which 
A follows and is written next to A, but at the bottom, as the contrary of B at the top.
Δ stands for all that cannot apply to A, and it goes on the A side, but in the middle, as 
having no answering group for the A’s. Likewise for the subject E: on the right side, Z 
at the top stands for what follows from E, H at the bottom for that from which E follows, 
and Θ in the middle for what cannot apply to E. »
The placeholder letters thus arrayed, the lines are filled in by Aristotle’s 
examples, and the diagram fairly draws itself. Aristotle’s cases in which syllogisms can 
be effected are as follows (44al8-25):
1. Ζ-Γ (FaCia in Minio-Paluello’s mnemonic), a first figure syllogism.
2. Γ-H (CoGenti), third figure.
3. Δ-Ζ (DeFert), first and second figures.
4. Θ-Β (HeBere), third figure.
5. H-Δ (GraDendo), first and third figures [Philoponus/Bochenski]
6. H-B (GalBa), first and third figures [Philoponus/Bochenski]
He goes on (44b25-38) to review the remaining three cases, which do not yield 
syllogisms. These are:
7. Z-B (FaBar), second figure, because of trying to conclude from two universal 
affirmative premisses.
52 Einarson, pp. 167-168.
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8. Θ-Γ (HirCe), first figure, because of trying to conclude with a negative minor 
premiss.
9. Θ-Δ (HeDes), first or second figures, because of trying to conclude from two 
negative premisses.
Aristotle's proof thus has accounted exhaustively for all components of premisses by 
The placeholder letters, for all premisses by the connection of the terms using the lines, 
and for all four kinds of conclusions.
Bochenski has suggested that, if diagrams are used in logical writing, their 
purpose is expository, probative, or mnemonic, or they may belong to methodology and 
be outside logic but relevant to it.53 The lune and triangle diagrams are at least 
mnemonic, as they help to keep the figures distinct. They are also expository, as they 
display the relations between the terms, while the linear arrays emphasize the terms 
related. They also provide a handy and efficient format for indicating quantity, quality, 
or modality—features of syllogisms suppressed in the very concise three-term arrays.4 It 
appears that the three standard syllogistic diagrams are probative as well, because they 
are proof forms, in Corcoran’s sense,55 that is to say, that they are gapless and rigorous, 
containing the maximum amount of logical detail. Aristotle’s perfect syllogisms are 
gapless, and his reductions to the first figure are likewise gapless, and the lune and 
triangle diagrams provide for the display of their maximum amount of logical detail.56
Bochenski thought that the pons asinorum was extra-logical and merely 
methodological— a help in finding the middle term. As methodological, this diagram is, 
of course, mnemonic as well, especially when reinforced by the mnemonic verses. If, 
however, as Smith has suggested, the inventio medii is a decision procedure, and the pons 
asinorum is an illustration of its proof, then the pons asinorum is a proof-form as well 
and thus not outside Aristotle’s logic. Interestingly, the pons asinorum codifies not only 
the logically rigorous proofs that make syllogisms, but it also codifies the three remaining 
possibilities that do not make syllogisms.
Subject-Connector-Predicate
It is clear that the premisses and conclusions of traditional syllogistic are subject- 
connector (copula)-predicate affairs. Some have expressed the view that the premisses of 
the Prior Analytics are likewise to be understood as made up of a subject term, a 
predicate term, and one of the four connectors, giving universal affirmative, universal 
negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative.57 It remains to be seen, however, 
whether this conclusion is correct. From the foregoing, two reasons to suspect that it is 
incorrect spring to mind: first, that the syntax of the Categories, On Interpretation, and
53 Bochenski, pp. 143-144.
54 Kneales, p. 187, “triangular figures . . .  to explain syllogisms and their reduction per
55 John Corcoran, “Three Logical Theories,” Philosophy o f Science, Volume 36, Number 2, June 1969, pp. 
153-177; see especially pp. 162-171.
56 Cf. Peirce, CP 2.601, 2.782; cf. 3.363.
57 Corcoran 2003, 268.
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Topics presents a function-argument analysis of propositions, and, second, that since 
Aristotle’s constructions with it are oblique, it is not entirely clear that ύπάρχειν is 
simply a connector, in the equational or copulative sense. To make this perfectly clear, 
let us parse a passage in which some of Aristotle’s formalized propositions appear, along 
with concrete substitutions for the variables (An. Pr. 25a22-26; the clauses displayed 
separately below are continuous, in the order presented, in Aristotle’s text):
εΐ δε γε τό  A τινι τω ν  Β μή υπάρχει, 
but if A does not apply to some one of the Bs,
Note here that Greek definite articles (in the neuter gender) are prefixed to the letter 
variables to indicate their grammatical role and, perhaps, to indicate that they are being 
mentioned, not used. Thus, τό  A indicates that A is nominative and singular, while 
τω ν  B indicates that B is genitive and plural, hence “of the Bs.” The demonstrative 
pronoun τινι is singular and dative, hence “to some one.”
οΰκ άνάνγκη και τό  Β τινι τ φ  A μή ύπάρχειν 
it is not necessary that B not apply to some A
Here, B is singular and nominative while A is singular and dative.
olov τό  μεν Β έστι ζφ ον τό  δε A άνθρωπος- 
for example, Β is ‘animal,Ά  ‘man’
Here both A and B are nominative and singular and ‘is’ (έστι)—not any inflection of 
ΰπάρχειν-is used for the substitution of concrete terms for the variables. The concrete 
terms are themselves nominative and singular.
άνθρωπος μεν γά ρ  où παντι ζ φ ω  bei/, υπάρχει], 
for ‘man’ does not apply to every ‘animal,’
Here, ‘man’ is again in the nominative singular, while ‘animal’ is in the dative singular. 
Tredennick, the Loeb translator, puts ‘man’ in single quotes, but not ‘animal.’ It is clear 
that άνθρωπος (‘man’) is being mentioned here, and since there is nothing in the text to 
indicate that ζ φ φ  (‘animal’), which Aristotle has substituted for a variable in exactly the 
same way, should be treated differently, I have enclosed it in single quotes as well, to 
indicate that it is being mentioned rather than used and to emphasize that 
ύπάρχειν operates on the terms, not on the designata of the terms.
ζφ ον  δε παντι άνθρώπςρ υπάρχει, 
but ‘animal’ applies to every ‘man.’
Here, ‘animal’ is nominative and singular, while ‘man’ is dative singular, and I argue, by 
the same reasoning as above, that both are terms being mentioned.
19
In Greek as in English, expressions on either side of ‘is’ or other parts of the verb 
‘to be’ typically are in the same case. Ancient Greek, an inflected language in which 
spelling tells what role a word has in a sentence, has peculiarities of word order that are 
not reflected in modem English, an analytic language in which word order, not spelling, 
tells what role a word has in a sentence. As has been argued earlier, Aristotle needed a 
construction which shows clearly which term is the predicate and which is the subject. 
Taken together with his stricture that the predicate must always be of a higher generality 
than the subject, his choice of ύπάρχειυ with the dative not only makes it unlikely that 
premisses in the Prior Analytics contain a copula but also may explain why there are no 
identity statements among those premisses.58
Again, Aristotle’s choice of ύπάρχειν shows, as Patzig remarked, that he 
shunned an equational interpretation of his propositions. Had Aristotle wanted to suggest 
a sort of default‘S is P’ interpretation of the propositions of his syllogistic, the Greek 
verb ‘to be’ was ready to hand and entirely natural. There was no need to introduce a 
fancy substitute if this was all that he meant. Aristotle does introduce technical terms or 
technical uses of otherwise ordinary terms, but always to some serious purpose. Perhaps 
the grammarians are at the root of the copulative interpretation of Aristotle.
Ύ πάρχειυ comes into Latin, especially late Latin, as substare, ‘to stand under’ and we 
eventually get (in 1559, according to the Shorter OED) ‘substantive verb’ for late Latin 
verbum substantivum, which in turn translates Greek 'ρήμα υπαρκτικόν. For Priscian 
(p. 812 ,fin.),the substantive verb was the verb ‘to be,’ but one is left to ponder what is
the ‘substantive’ sense or use o f ‘to be.’ (Cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, de Syntaxi 65:13 and 
De Pronominibus 25:2.)
The Intended Interpretation of Aristotle’s Syllogistic
Cohen and Nagel say that Aristotle’s syllogistic may be interpreted as a calculus 
of classes, which undoubtedly is true, since it has been so interpreted.59 It remains to be 
seen, however, whether there is good evidence that this was Aristotle’s intended 
interpretation.
To begin, it may be observed that the modem notion of ‘class’ is indeed 
modem—entering English usage in 1664.60 The English word ‘class’ derives from Latin 
classis, whose first meaning is a census class (or tax bracket, under Servius Tullius, sixth 
king of Rome, traditionally 578-535 B.C.); the Latin in turn derives from Greek κλήσις, 
from καλέω, ‘call’ or ‘summon.’ Κλήσις does not occur in the corpus ,61
Indeed, the modem notion of class as a collection of objects is somewhat foreign not only 
to Aristotle’s thought but to ancient Greek thought generally. Aristotle does indeed give
58 Note to Einarson
59M. Cohen and E. Nagel, Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), 1993, 
p. 121. Cf., e.g., Corcoran 2003, 269, “. . .  Aristotle’s choice o f a class o f propositions . . .  whose 
connectors include the simplest logical relations among species, namely inclusion and exclusion.”
60 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, ad loc.
61 H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus.
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us words for ‘kind’-εΤδος and γέυος-but these are part of an apparatus of definition, not 
a calculus of classes. For him and his contemporaries, other words that might be 
rendered ‘class’ in English, like τάξις, refer first to the arrangement of soldiers, say, and 
then only later and derivatively to the collection of soldiers thus arranged. In his ,
Aristotle does use τέλος, an expression that has been rendered ‘class,’ when he reports 
that Solon appointed all the offices from the Five-hundred bushel class, the Teamsters, 
and the Knighthood, while the Thetes or day labourers were excluded from office {Pol. 
1274a20-22). The Peripatetic Constitution o f the Athenians (vii) reports that Solon 
divided the citizens of Athens by worth into the four τέλη discussed in the Politics.62
Rose, in discussing the method of division exhibited in Plato’s Statesman, 
declares
Since it is convenient to treat the original idea which is first divided as a 
more comprehensive class or genus, and the ideas which fall under it as 
species or subclasses, there is a danger that we will misconstrue the nature 
of Plato’s ideas. They are not classes in the modem sense.. . .  Classes . . .  
are the barest of abstractions . . .  The modem notion of class or set is not to 
be read into Plato’s writings. (We shall see that it is not to be read into 
Aristotle’s writings either.)”63
Rose, after having pointed out that there is no reason in most of the arguments considered 
in the Prior Analytics to assume that the major term will be larger than the minor term, 
goes on to say what he means about not reading a modem notion of class into Aristotle’s 
writings:
When you get into other figures [than the first], or when you deal with 
statements that are or may be false, there is no longer any guarantee 
that the terms or classes will stand in the relation of larger, middle-sized, 
and smaller.. . .  The question of the extension or size of the classes 
designated by various terms becomes completely irrelevant when 
Aristotle introduces variables for terms. When you investigate syllogistic 
logic in terms of ABC rather than plants-trees-maples, questions of 
factual truth and falsity and factual extension, inclusion, etc., become 
irrelevant.64
62 J. J. Mulhem, “TO N ATT AGO Σ ΠΟΛΙΤΗΝ (Aristotle, Pol. 1275al9),” International Conference on 
Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Fordham University Lincoln Center, 1st November 2003, suggests that 
Aristotle, for whom τέλος in many cases means ‘end’, in the sense o f that at which an agent aims, uses the 
term here to emphasize that Solon’s division is based on what the various divisions of the population 
produce in total. He observes further: “Aristotle is not concerned here with classes in either the Boolean or 
the Marxian sense.”
63 Rose 1968, 6.
64 Rose 1968, 11.
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Thus it would seem that the burden of proof is on those who would urge that a 
class interpretation is the primary one intended for Aristotle’s syllogistic, not the other 
way round.
Conclusion
A formal language was invented by Aristotle and used by him in his lectures.
This formal language consisted of Greek capital letters used as placeholders, arrayed in 
the schemata of the three figures recognized as authentically Aristotle’s. In these arrays, 
arcs under the placeholder letters indicate how the terms are linked in the premisses and 
conclusion and are read as some inflection of ΰπάρχειν, used by Aristotle as a second-
order expression to convey the relation that the terms—not the designata of the terms-of 
a syllogism have to one another. It is further possible that Aristotle elaborated the three- 
term arrays with arcs into lime and triangle diagrams like those appearing in Ammonius, 
Philoponus and the Scholia Platónica. The lune and triangle diagrams are developed 
easily out of the three-term arrays with arcs, and they are consistent with the figures’ 
being the schemata of their instances the moods, which moods are in turn schemata of the 
syllogisms themselves. Conditions in Aristotle’s classroom make it plausible that the 
diagrams were in use there, whether by master or by pupil. These diagrams serve as proof 
forms, as does the pons asinorum diagram, obviously constructible from Aristotle’s 
remarks in Prior Analytics 1: 27-28. As proof-forms of the syllogistic, the diagrams are 
not mere addenda to Aristotle’s system, which makes it more likely that he developed 
them himself.
This formal language in the Prior Analytics accommodates all the kinds of 
propositions that are discussed in the Categories, On Interpretation, and Topics. The 
analysis of Aristotle’s formal language presented here corrects the views that his logic 
uses propositions of the subject-copula-predicate form and that the intended interpretation 
of his syllogistic is as a logic of class inclusion and exclusion. -
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